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NOTES
WILLS-A PROBLEM IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
A testator made a will and had it subscribed by two attest-
aug witnesses. One of the latter was also a legatee. When the
will was offered for probate the non-legatee attester was avail-
able and testified to the material racts concerning the execution
of the will. The legatee attester did not testify and did not
appear in court. Under such circumstances should his legacy
be considered a valid one 2
In the case of Doyle v. -Brady' the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals answered this question in the affirmative. It reached its
conclusion under a statute providing
"If a will is attested by a person to whom, or to
whose wife or husband, any beneficial interest in the
estate is devised or bequeathed, and the will cannot
otherwise be proved, such person shall be deemed a
competent witness; but such devise or bequest shall be
void, "2
This decision was reached in spite of the fact that the
court had before it another statute requiring that a will be
attested and subscribed by at least two credible witnesses.3
The rule laid down in Doyle v. Brady has been followed in
subsequent decisions and appears to be established in Ken-
tueky4 It is the function of this note to examine the sound-
ness of the result reached and to determine whether or not
there is any conflict between the two statutes cited.
The requirement that a will shall be attested by credible
witnesses is of statutory origin and its application is, therefore,
a problem of statutory construction. The original English Wills
Act of 1540; did not require attestation of any land, but
the Statute of Frauds of 1676 included a provision that all
devises of lands must be attested and subscribed by "three or
'170 Ky. 316, 185 S.W 1133 (1916).2 KY. R. S. (1946) Sec. 394.210 (2).
'Ky. R. S. (1946) Sec. 394.040.
4Calvert v Calvert, 208 Ky. 760, 271 S.W 1082 (1925), see
Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky 180, 191, 82 S.W 2d 297, 302-303 (1935).
Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540) 2 STATUTES AT LARGE 272.
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four credible witnesses." 6 The requirement of an attestation
in England was not extended to testaments of personalty until
the Wills Act of 1837 ;7 however, most American wills statutes
followed the English Statute of Frauds and m doing so extended
it to include both realty and personalty 8 Such was the tenor
of the Kentucky statute, first enacted m 1797, and as originally
adopted the Kentucky act used the word "competent" m de-
scribing the type of witness required for attestation.9 In the
Revised Statutes of 1852, the word "credible" was substituted
for "competent.'"'" It is difficult to find any reason -why
this substitution of words was made, but whatever might have
been the reason, there was no change in effect. It is quite gener-
ally held in England"i and in other American jurisdictions12
that so far as attesters are concerned, "credible" and "compe-
tent" are synonymous, and this position was taken by Kentucky
after the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1852.13 It is cer-
tainly a sound interpretation then to say that the Kentucky
statute requires that a will be attested and subscribed by at
least two "competent" witnesses.
The theory of requiring competent witnesses to attest
wills grew up at a time when a person who had any beneficial
interest in the thing in issue was not a competent witness for
any purpose in any type of case.1 4 'While that disability has
been removed in most situations,i 5 it is still m effect as to
attestors, never having been altered by statute. It is quite
generally held that a person who has a direct beneficial inter-
Stat. 29 Car. II, c. 3, sec. 5 (1676) 3 STATUTES AT LARGE 385.
Stat. 7 Win. IV & I Vict., c. 26, sec. 9 (1837) 32 STATUTES AT
LARGE 489.
'Bordwell, The Statute of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 8-9.
'See LAws OF KENTUCKY (1802) Part X, p. 282.
'0REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY (1852) C. 106, sec. 5, p. 694.
1I SCHOULER, WILLS, EXECUTORS, AND ADMINISTRATORS (5th ed.
1915) Sec. 350.
2Jones v Grieser, 238 Ill. 183, 15 Ann. Cas. 787, 87 N. E. 295
(1909) Nixon v Armstrong, 38 Texas 297, 298 (1873), 1 PAGE,
WILLS (3d ed. 1941) Sec. 312; Evans, The Competency of Testamen-
tary Witnesses (1927) 25 Mica. L. REV. 238.
13Fuller v Fuller, 83 Ky. 345 (1885), Savage v. Bulger, 25 Ky
L. Rep. 1269, 77 S.W 717 (1903)
'" 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) See. 575.
Id. at Sec. 576.
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est in a will cannot be a competent attesting witness to that
will.'6
It can be seen that a strict application of this rule would
defeat an entire will if one of the required witnesses happened
be a beneficiary of even a small gift under the will and such
was the result in the early cases.1 7 However, this apparently
harsh rule was altered in England by statute which provided
that the gift to the attesting witness was void, but the will,
as to its other provisions, was valid.18 Thus competency in the
witness was achieved by abolishing his interest and it is
believed that the Kentucky statute under which the Doyle case
was decided was intended to accomplish tis result and nothing
more.
The Kentucky court seems to have adopted the view that
the time of competency refers to the time of probate and not to
the time of execution. Such a position is unsound in theory
and is in conflict with the general weight of authority19 and
is not in harmony with the cases in Kentucky prior to the Doyle
case. 20 The fallacious reasonmg of the court appears to be
a result of their confusion concerning the proper function of
an attesting witness, and their failure to recognize the distinc-
tion between attesting witnesses and testifyvig witnesses. The
qualifications of attesters are properly determined by the sub-
stantive law of wills and not by rules of evidence. 2 ' The com-
petency of persons called as testifying witnesses is an entirely
different matter and properly belongs in a different field. The
immediate question is whether or not the will was properly
executed and one of the requirements of a proper execution is
"Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 10 Allen (Mass.) 155 (1865), Haven
v. Hilliard, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 10 (1839), Lord v. Lord, 58 N. H. 7
(1876), 1 JARMAN, WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 80; 1 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed.
1941) Sec. 319.
17 Holdfast d. Anstey v Dowsing, 2 Strange 1253, 93 Eng. Rep. R.
1164 (1746).
21 Stat. 25 Geo. II, c. 6, sec. 1, (1752) 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 411.
"Gillis v Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 51 Am. St. Rep. 121, 23 S. E. 107
(1895) In re Trinitarian Church, 91 Md. 416, 40 A. 325 (1898),
Rockland Trust Co. v Bixby, 247 Mass. 449, 142 N.E. 107 (1924)
In re Potter's Will, 89 Vt. 361, 95 A. 646 (1915) ATKINSON, WILLS
(1937) 261, 1 REDFIELD, LAW OF WILLS (4th ed. 1876) 256.
'Fuller v. Fuller, 83 Ky. 345 (1885), Savage v. Bulger, 25 Ky.
L. Rep. 1269, 77 S.W 717 (1903)112 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 14, at Sec. 582.
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that it be attested and subscribed by two "competent" witnesses.
When the attester subscribes his name to a will he is at that
moment witnessing a state of things then existing or an act in
course of performance. Such witnesses are persons with whom
the testator is surrounded in order that no fraud may be prac-
ticed upon him 22 and unless they are competent at the time it is
difficult to see how there can be a proper execution. 23 Although
these attesting witnesses are for the protection of the testator,
the testator has no authority to waive such protection. The
statute requires it as part of the formalities essential to a
proper execution.
The determining factor in deciding the correctness of the
decision in the Doyle case is whether or not the legislature,
by the adoption of what is now Ientucky Revised Statutes
394.210, changed the common law meaning of the word "com-
p,etent" as applied to attesting witnesses to wills. The statute
states that if " the will cannot otherwise be proved, such
person shall be deemed a competent witness, but such devise or
bequest shall be void, " It appears that the legislature has
created competency by destroying interest. It is difficult to
find any intent to permit competency and interest both to
exist in the same person. The court seems to have read the
statute as if it had stated, "Such devise or bequest shall be void,
unless the interested attester shall not testify in which case it
shall be valid." The words in italics are not to be found in
the statute.
The court stated that when it was admitted that the will
was valid except for the legacy to the interested attester it
was admitted that the will was validly executed. Here again,
however, the reasoning of the court appears to be fallacious
in that it seems to ignore the fact that it is the elimination of
the interest that makes the execution valid. The will can
become valid in its other parts only by destroying the legacy to
' 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (Redfield's edition 1868) Sec. 691.
21 "There is, therefore, the more propriety in requiring such per-
sons to possess competency, at the time of attesting the act; since the
judgment .and opinion of the witnesses, formed at the time, and
from observations then made, much of winch could not be per-
fectly recalled, so as to enable the witness to rejudge that question,
after the removal of any disability existing at the time, is to become
testimony." 1 REDFIELD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 256-257.
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the viterested attester The effect of the statute was to destroy
the legacy ab snitzo and thereby establish the competency of
the purported legatee as an attesting witness. No doubt the
legislature at the time of the adoption of Kentucky Bewsed
Statites 394.210 was aware of the common law meaning of the
word "competent" as applied to attesters and the presumption
is that if it had intended to effect any change in the meaning
of that word it would have expressly so stated.
Great emphasis appears to have been placed by the court
upon the words, "If the will cannot otherwise be proved."
It erred in believing that the will in question was otherwise
proved. While it is true that a will can be proved by one
witness it is also true that all facts necessary to constitute a
valid execution must be proved. In this case the attester testi-
fied to the capacity of the testator and to his signature, but he
did not and could not testify that the will was subscribed by two
credible witnesses since one of the subscribing witnesses was
an interested witness and, therefore, neither competent nor
credible. Until it was properly attested and subscribed it could
not become a valid will.
It would appear that the proper interpretation of the
phrase, "cannot otherwise be proved," would be that it applies
to all situations in winch a beneficiary is needed as an attesting
witness in order to make up the two attesters required by
Kentcky Rewised Statutes 394.040. If lie is needed to fill
that requirement he is made competent by the destruction of ins
interest. But if the attesting has any meaning at all, the
witness must be competent at the time he attests, and the inter-
est must be destroyed as applicable to that time and is accom-
plished by the act of subscribing one's name as an attester. A
situation in winch the will can be otherwise proved would
arise where there was a surplus of attesters. In such an event it
could be shown that the will was attested and subscribed by two
competent witnesses even though the name of a third or fourth
incompetent witness appeared on the instrument. This result
has been reached in at least two jurisdictions having statutes
similar to the Kentucky statute.
The Supreme Court of Texas, under a statute almost
identical with the Kentucky statute, had before it in the case
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of Fowler v. Stagner24 a situation similar to that of the
principal case. The phrase, "If the will cannot otherwise be
proved," was interpreted to mean, "If the will cannot other-
wise be established as 'a valid will." The court held that
when the non-legatee attester appeared as a testifying witness
and proved the execution of the will he proved its invalidity
since his testimony showed that one of the two attesting
witnesses required by law was an interested witness and,
therefore, not a competent attester. It was the opinion of the
court that the only means of giving any effect to the will
was by holding that the supposed beneficiary by the very act
of subscribing his name as a witness destroyed his gift.
A like result with comparable reasoning was reached in
Virginia under a similar statute in the case of Britce v. Shider 25
The principle was there laid down that the primary purpose of
the statute requiring that a will be attested by competent
witnesses was to protect the testator from frauds and per~juries
and that to hold that the tests for competency were to be
applied at the time of the probate rather than at the time of
execution would defeat that purpose. Like the Texas case
cited above, the Virgima court held that to establish the will as
a valid one it was necessary that the testifying witness prove
that it was executed with all the formalities requisite to a
proper execution, one of those requisites being that the will
was attested and subscribed by two competent witnesses. As
soon as it appeared that one of the subscribing witnesses to
the will was named in the instrument as a beneficiary, Is
competency as an attester could not be considered except under
the section of the statute voiding his gift.
The state of West Virginia has a statute practically the
same as the Kentucky statute and in the case of Davws v DavIs26
it placed upon it an interpretation which coincides with the
Kentucky position. It was admitted that "competent" wit-
nesses were required as attesters but it was held that the statute
rendering a beneficiary competent by destroying his gift
referred to the competency at the time of probate and not at the
"55 Texas 393 (1881).
108 Va. 670, 62 S.E. 973 (1908)
43 W Va. 300, 27 S.E. 323 (1897)
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time of execution. From this point they reasoned that although
an interested witness was not a competent testifying witness
he was a competent attesting witness. It is difficult to see how
such an inference can be drawn from the words used by the
legislature, and it is believed that that court, like the Kentucky
court, read into the statute a meamng winch was not there.
The holding in Davis v. Davis differs but slightly from
the contention of Lord Mansfield m Windham v Chetwynd2 7
that "credible" does not mean "competent" and that compe-
tency refers to the time of testifying rather than to the time of
execution. Thus, m ins usual straightforward manner, Lord
Mansfield, by denying the necessity for competent attesters,
met the issue more squarely than did the West Virginia court.
However, Lord Mansfield's position is unsound in that it ignores
the Substantial nature of the requirement that attesters be
"credible." His view was not followed m England after his
death2 s and, as previously indicated, it is m conflict with the
great weight of authority
In addition to the West Virginia case, the Kentucky court
cited in support of its position a line of cases in New York
holding that if an attesting witness to a will is a beneficiary
under the will but is not needed as a testifying witness is
gift is not defeated.29 While the Kentucky court indicated
that the New York cases were decided under a statute similar
to that of Kentucky, the fact is that the New York statute is
radically different. The applicable section 3o is entitled, "De-
vise or bequeath to subscribing witnesses," and provides that if
a subscribing witness to a will is also a beneficiary
1 Burr. 413, 97 Eng. Rep. 377 (1757)
Hatfield v Thorp, 5 B. & Ald. 589, 106 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1822).
Caw v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 125 (1851) Cornwell v.
Wooley, 47 Barb. (N.Y.) 327 (1866), In re Owen, 26 Misc. Rep.
(N.Y.) 179, 56 N.Y.S. 853 (1899).
"Deise or bequest to subscribing witnesses. If any person
shall be a subscribing witness to the execution of any will, wherein
any beneficial devise, legacy, interest or appointment of any real or
personal estate shall be made to such witness, and such will cannot
be proved without the testimony of such witness, the said devise,
legacy, interest or appointment shall be void, so far only as concerns
such witness, or any claiming under hun; and such person shall be
a competent witness, and compellable to testify respecting the execu-
tion of the said will, in like manner as if no such devise or bequest
had been made." 1 LAWS OF NEW YORK (Thompson, 1939) c. 18,
sec. 27.
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and such will cannot be proved without the testimony of such
witnesses, " then the gift fails. Thus the statute makes
it clear that it is the testimony and not the attestation by the
interested witness that defeats the gift. Even if the Kentucky
statute were as specific as that of New York we would still
have the problem of a proper execution including an attesta-
tion by two credible witnesses. However, such a problem is not
faced in New York because the New York statute on execution
merely requires two attesting witnesses but does not specify
that they should be credible.31 Thus it can be seen that the
New York statute is by no means comparable with that of
Kentucky
Kenttcky Revised Statutes 394.040 and 394.210 can both
be given full efficacy according to the plain meaning of the
words used without creating any conflict between them. Sec-
tion 394.040 requires that a will be attested and subscribed by
two credible witnesses. Section 394.210 provides that if the
credibility of a witness conflicts with his interest, his interest
will have to yield to his credibility The credibility of the
witness would be established by destroying his interest. Since
it is necessary that credible witnesses (attesters) subscribe their
names in the presence of the testator, such witnesses (attesters)
must be credible at the time. The question whether or not
such persons later become testifying witnesses is then wholly
immaterial so far as the effect it can have on a valid execution
is concerned. In order to support the position taken by the
Kentucky court it should be clearly shown that the legislature
intended to change the meamng of the word "competent" as
applied to attesting witnesses, and no such intent appears. An
indication of how that result may be accomplished is indicated
by the New York statute referred to above and even its pro-
visions were not sufficiently clear to avoid some confusion.
The case of Doyle v Brady, having the effect of giving an
erroneous interpretation to one statute32 and nullifying part
""Manner of execution of will. 4. There shall be at least
two attesting witnesses, each of whom shall sign his name as a wit-
ness, at the end of the will, at the request of the testator." 1 LAws
OF NEw YORK (Thompson, 1939) c. 18, sec. 21.
32 Ky. R. S. (1946) Sec. 394.210.
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of another,3 3 is unsound and should not be followed. It is
believed that the view taken by Texas and Virginia in the in-
terpretation of similar statutes has much stronger support in
both logic and authority It is also a very serious question
whether or not the policy of maling interested persons compe-
tent as attesting witnesses to the execution of wills would be
desirable. Credible witnesses are required as attesters in order
to prevent testators from being imposed upon. They constitute
a shield protecting the testator at a time when he is likely to be
s extremes or, for other reasons, might easily fall into the
control of unscrupulous, crafty, or fraudulent interested wit-
nesses if such persons were permitted to serve as attesters. If
the Kentucky court is right in its holding that a legatee may
properly attest his own gift, that protecting shield is destroyed
and the reasons for attestation itself are rather obscure.
It is submitted that it would represent a much sounder
policy if the Kentucky court would adopt the view taken by
Texas and Virginia, and leave to the legislature the matter of
writing a new definition of competent attesters.
BERTEL MN. SPARKS
'Ky. R. S. (1946) Sec. 394.040.
